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I 
It was over 2,000 years ago that Zeno propounded 
his now famous arguments against motion. The four 
paradoxes he suggests allegedly lead to the conclusion 
that motion is impossible, and have sparked comments by 
philosophers as diverse as Aristotle, Hegel, and 
Russell. In the present paper, I will consider Zeno's 
first paradox—the Dichotomy--and the modern attempt to 
discount it. I will contend that the most philosophi-
cally interesting version of the Dichotomy undermines 
the widely held claim that the dilemma it presents can 
be resolved by an appeal to mathematical truths about 
the summation of an infinite series. If this is the 
case, then philosophers like Robinson, 1 Burnet, 2 
Booth, 1 Russell," Whitehead,* Carnap,* Quine, 7 Vlas-
tos,' and others have failed to recognize the fundamen-
tal questions the Dichotomy raises. Nevertheless, 
their account of the paradox is the predominant one,' 
and has been expounded in books by Grünbaum 1 0 and 
Salmon. 1 1 Indeed, it has been claimed (by Maxwell and 
Feigl) 1 2 that the summation answer to Zeno's reasoning 
provides a paradigm solution to a philosophical pro-
blem, and (by Boyer) 1 1 that it demonstrates the power 
of the calculus. Within contemporary philosophy, it 
has also sparked the discussion of 'infinity machines' 
by Grünbaum, Vlastos, Black, l k Thomson, 1 1 Benacceraf, 1 4 
and others. The final outcome of this discussion has 
been the account of infinite sequences of acts adopted 
by philosophers like Grünbaum, Vlastos, Putnam, 1 7 and 
Boolos and Jeffrey.1' If the position I argue for is 
correct however, then all of these philosophers--and 
philosophers (like C. D. Broad1* and Philip Jones) 2'• 
who apply similar considerations to Zeno's Achilles 
paradox—have failed to come to grips with the funda-
mental issues raised by Zeno's Dichotomy argument. 
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II 
According to the Dichotomy argument, any motion is 
impossible because it requires the crossing of an in-
finite series of distances one by one. One half the 
total distance must be crossed, then one quarter, then 
one eighth, and so on ad infinitum. If d is the 
distance in question, then each distance in the series 
.5 d, .25 d, .125 d, . . . must be crossed in turn and 
this is alleged to be impossible. Zeno concludes that 
a motion which traverses d cannot be completed. We can 
summarize his argument as follows. 
1) The completion of any motion requires the 
traversing of an infinite sequence of succes-
sive distances. 
2) The traversing of an infinite sequence of suc-
cessive distances cannot be completed. 
Hence no motion can be completed. 
In order to distinguish two interpretations of this ar-
gument, we need to consider two accounts of its second 
premise. 
The usual interpretation of the Dichotomy claims 
that Zeno holds that the crossing of an infinite 
sequence of distances is impossible because it would 
require an infinite amount of time. When portrayed in 
this way, the paradox claims that the passage of an in-
finite number of time intervals (one for every distance 
in Zeno's sequence) must take an infinite amount of 
time, and that the motion across all the distances 
therefore requires an infinite amount of time. This 
version of the Dichotomy is easily unravelled, for— 
contrary to Zeno's supposed claim—an infinite series 
of time intervals may be completed in a finite time. 
To take an obvious example, the sequence .5 minute, .25 
minute, .125 minute, . . . is infinite, but neverthe-
less elapses in one minute. It follows that this in-
terpretation of the Dichotomy leads to the conclusion 
that its second premise is false, and to the conclusion 
that the argument it presents is not sound. As Quine 
writes: 
When we try to make this argument more ex-
plicit, the fallacy that emerges is the 
mistaken notion that any infinite succession 
of intervals of time has to add up to 
eternity. Actually when an infinite succes-
sion of intervals of time is so chosen that 
the succeeding intervals become shorter, the 
whole succession may take either a finite or 
an infinite amount of time. It is a question 
of a convergent series. 1 1 
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Such a view (endorsed 
Russell, Booth, etc.) has 
Dichotomy is undermined 
because J, b = 1 ) . And 
case, it certainly is 
claims: 
by Quine, Grünbaum, Salmon, 
led to the claim that the 
by modern mathematics (i.e. 
whether or not this is the 
true that, as Wesley Salmon 
To whatever extent these paradoxes [the 
Dichotomy and the Achilles) raised problems 
about the intelligibility of adding up infin-
itely many positive terms, the nineteenth-
century theory of convergent series resolve 
the problem. 2 1 
Yet it is a mistake to think that this is all there is 
to the Dichotomy paradox. Indeed, such a view ignores 
a philosophically more significant interpretation of 
the Dichotomy argument. 
Ill 
Because Zeno's own discussion of motion is not 
extant, it is difficult to settle exegetical questions 
about the various arguments he proposes. It should 
perhaps be pointed out that Aristotle's account of the 
Dichotomy does, for the most part, suggest the inter-
pretation we have already noted. Nevertheless, 
Aristotle himself admits (at Physics, 236a) that this 
version fails to present all the issues the Dichotomy 
raises, and others have suggested that we can under-
stand the Dichotomy in another way. For present pur-
poses, it suffices to note that the alternative inter-
pretation creates a more poignant philosophical dilemma 
(and one that undermines contemporary discussions of 
infinity). The account of the Dichotomy that Simp-
licius gives does back this second interpretation, but 
I will leave it as an open question which version of 
the argument was Zeno's. Suffice to say, it would be 
surprising if an argument which so naturally lends it-
self to the alternative interpretation was meant in the 
weaker way that Aristotle and most commentators 
suggest. 
To reconstruct the Dichotomy argument, we need to 
reinterpret its second premise. According to the 
second version of the argument, the traversing of 
Zeno's infinite sequence of distances is not impossible 
because it requires an infinite amount of time. 
Rather, the crossing of the distances one by one is al-
leged to be impossible because the series contains no 
last element. In attempting to traverse the distances, 
one therefore crosses a particular distance and contin-
ually proceeds to another distance which must be 
traversed. One never reaches a last distance, its com-
pletion, and the consequent completion of the series. 
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It allegedly follows that one cannot complete the 
series. 
A number of things must be said about this ac-
count of Zeno's reasoning. Those commentators who have 
confronted it have usually denied that it presents a 
genuine paradox. Philosophers like Grunbaum, Salmon, 
Vlastos," and Thomson have maintained that it simply 
begs the question. They maintain that the completed 
crossing of Zeno's sequence of distances does not 
require the crossing of a last distance within the 
sequence. In his encyclopedia article on infinity, 
Thomson for example, writes that: 
If we turn to . . . the claim that an infinite 
sequence cannot be completed, we see that it 
begs the question. It is simply not true that 
however many of an infinite sequence we take, 
others remain, but only that whatever finite 
numbers be taken, others remain. What causes 
trouble is doubtless that (in the kind of 
sequence we are talking of) there is no last 
term, so that one does not see what finishing 
consists in in such a case. But, in the con-
text of the Race Course (the Dichotomy) 
anyway, this trouble is illusory; finishing 
consists in occupying the limit point of the 
class . . . a* 
One must, of course, grant Thomson that "It simply is 
not true that however many of an infinite sequence we 
take others remain, but only that whatever finite num-
bers be taken, others remain". Yet this claim does not 
count against the Dichotomy argument, for the problem 
with our attempt to complete Zeno's sequence of 
distances is precisely that we cross the distances in 
the sequence a finite number at a time--i.e. one by 
one. The question at issue is how we can, proceeding 
in this way, ever come to a point where we have crossed 
an infinite number of distances, and the claim in 
question is the claim that we cannot do so because we 
never reach a distance which counts as the last element 
in an infinite sequence. The claim that we can cross 
an infinite sequence of distances despite its lack of a 
last element, and the bald assertion that we can 
thereby reach the limit point of Zeno's sequence, both 
beg the very question at issue. One needs an argument 
to establish that these claims are true, and Thomson 
does not provide one. Once one examines their conse-
quences, it becomes clear that any such claims are 
wholly arbitrary. 
One way to demonstrate the plausibility of the 
second version of the Dichotomy is to note that it 
derives its force from the following general principle. 
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PSM (The Principle of Sequential Motion): The 
crossing of a sequence of successive spatial 
intervals does not take one to a point % un-
less J is reached by the crossing of one of 
the intervals in the sequence. 
To gain an intuitive grasp of PSM, consider the motion 
of a pen that draws the line a b e d . Such a pen 
crosses the intervals ab, be, cd, and the claim that in 
doing so it reaches some point outside the line ad 
would border on the preposterous. It is clear that the 
pen's crossing of the sequence of intervals ab, be, cd 
does not, without a futher motion, take it to a point 
outside all these intervals. All this seems obvious 
and undeniable, and similar considerations show that 
PSM holds for finite sequence of spatial intervals 
generally. 
The second version of the Dichotomy gains its 
force from the application of PSM to infinite sequences 
of spatial intervals.2* For, given that the crossing 
of a sequence of intervals does not take one to a point 
outside the sequence, the crossing of the sequence Zeno 
proscribes can never take one to the endpoint of a 
motion (for this point lies outside all the intervals 
within the sequence). Any attempt to complete the 
motion by crossing the intervals one by one therefore 
seems bound to failure (though it is also necessary for 
the completion of the motion). It is as though one 
tried to move something to a point b by repeatedly mov-
ing it to points that all fall short of b. 
When construed in this way, the Dichotomy argu-
ment is formidable. Its strength lies in the implausi-
bility of the claim that PSM does not hold for all 
sequences of spatial intervals. This claim is particu-
larly implausible given that PSM obviously holds for 
finite sequences of intervals. For what is the dif-
ference between finite and infinite sequences which 
would allow PSM to be transgressed in one case but not 
the other? As there appears to be no relevant dif-
ferences, we must surely treat them similarly and apply 
PSM to infinite sequences of spatial intervals. Once 
we do so however, it immediately follows that one can 
never complete the one by one crossing of an infinite 
sequence of intervals. The crossing of the intervals 
in the sequence never brings one to a last interval, 
and never to a point where one has crossed all the in-
tervals in the sequence. According to PSM, it follows 
that the crossing of the sequence cannot take one to 
such a point. 
In their dealings with the Dichotomy argument, 
contemporary commentators have offhandedly rejected PSM 
by declaring that we can reach the endpoint of a motion 
by undertaking to cross Zeno's distances one by one. 
Yet the usual 'explanation'—that motion may be com-
pleted because it can be contained in a finite amount 
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of time--does not address the problems that arise in 
regard to PSM. For even though the crossing of an in-
finite sequence of spatial intervals does not require 
an infinite amount of time, this does not, in any way, 
explain the violation of PSM that the completion of 
this crossing requires. In regard to finite sequences 
of motion, the crossing of a finite sequence of spatial 
intervals may (obviously) be contained in a finite 
amount of time, but this does not allow the violation 
of PSM. Hence there is no reason to suppose that it 
should allow the violation of the principle in regard 
to infinite sequences of spatial intervals. If commen-
tators want to show that the completion of Zeno's 
sequence is made possible by its finite duration, then 
they must show that finite duration makes possible a 
transgression of PSM. This they have failed to do. 
In view of such considerations, commentators like 
Grünbaum, Salmon, Thomson, et. al. simply beg the 
question when they claim that, despite its lack of a 
last interval, an infinite sequence of spatial inter-
vals can be crossed one by one. And although this 
claim is, on the one hand, understandable (for motion 
is possible, and we can reach the endpoint of a 
motion), it fails completely as an answer to the philo-
sophical problem Zeno's Dichotomy presents. PSM seems 
to be an obviously valid principle and one who rejects 
it needs to explain how it can be violated. Why is it 
that the crossing of a sequence of spatial intervals 
can, by itself, take one to a point outside all the in-
tervals in the sequence? In completing the sequence 
one crosses the individual intervals and does nothing 
else besides. How then can one reach a point that one 
doesn't reach in crossing one of the intervals in 
question? And how is it that PSM holds in regard to a 
finite sequence of spatial intervals, but not in regard 
to all infinite sequences? One cannot answer such 
questions in a satisfactory way simply by ignoring 
them. 
IV 
In light of the problems the Dichotomy raises, 
some brief comments on contemporary discussions of in-
finite sequences of acts are in order. In connection 
with Zeno's paradoxes, questions about such sequences 
have centered around the possibility of 'infinity 
machines'--machines designed to perform an infinite 
sequence of acts. Machines designed to perform a 
variety of tasks (the counting of all the natural num-
bers, the execution of an infinite number of movements, 
etc.) have been discussed. Commentators like Grünbaum, 
Salmon, Putnam, and Boolos and Jeffrey have claimed 
that the possibility of such machines turns on the 
question of whether or not they can be designed to per-
form their sequences of acts within finite parameters 
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(i.e. without employing an infinite amount of time, 
space, or energy). It should now be clear that there 
is more to the matter than this. For though the com-
pletion of an infinite sequence of acts would be im-
possible if it required an infinite amount of space, 
time, or energy, it does not follow that it is possible 
if this is not the case. In the latter circumstances 
it may be said to be impossible because such a sequence 
contains no last act. It seems to follow that an in-
finity machine would have to continually perform acts 
one after the other, without ever reaching a final act, 
its completion, and the consequent completion of the 
sequence in question. 
In light of such considerations, it is a simple 
matter to base the conclusion that an infinite sequence 
of acts cannot be completed on reasoning analogous to 
that contained in the second version of the Dichotomy 
argument. Whereas the reasoning in the Dichotomy argu-
ment was built upon the principle PSM, this analogous 
reasoning can be grounded on the following principle: 
PSA (The Principle of Sequential Acts): The 
performance of a sequence of acts does not 
complete a particular task unless it is com-
pleted by the performance of one of the acts 
in the sequence. 
Essentially, PSA stipulates that one cannot complete a 
particular task by performing (in sequence) acts which 
do not complete the task in question. Such a principle 
is plausible and once it is accepted it follows that an 
infinite sequence of acts cannot be completed, for no 
act within the sequence brings it to completion. It is 
as though one tried to accomplish a task by repeatedly 
performing actions which failed to complete the task in 
question. 
In the present context, we need not consider PSA 
in detail. It is not difficult to make a case for it, 
and it straightforwardly follows that no infinite 
sequence of acts can be completed. In the present con-
text, it suffices to note that the arguments that lead 
to this conclusion are analogous to the Dichotomy argu-
ment (once it has been interpreted in the outlined 
way). Until the problems the Dichotomy raises have 
been answered, there is little reason to expect the 
resolution of the more general problems that arise in 
regard to infinite sequences of acts. Until philo-
sophers have a better answer to the Dichotomy paradox, 
it is premature to contemplate the completion of any 
such sequence. 
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